JGL congratulates Lindsay Parvis who was recently named to both the Top 50: Top 50: 2023 Women Maryland Super Lawyers List and the Top 100: Top 100: 2023 Maryland Super Lawyers List

In addition, the 2023 edition of Maryland Super Lawyers magazine recently named nine Joseph Greenwald & Laake, P.A. attorneys to its annual Maryland Super Lawyers list, and two JGL attorneys to Super Lawyers Rising Stars.

JGL attorneys who made this year’s Super Lawyers list, including their primary practice areas as identified by Super Lawyers, are:

David Bulitt – Family Law (Rockville)
Patrick Dragga – Family Law (Rockville)
Jeffrey Greenblatt – Family Law (Rockville)
Lindsay P. Parvis – Family Law, TOP 100 Maryland Super Lawyers / Top 50 Women Maryland Super Lawyers (Rockville)
Jay Holland – Employment & Labor (Greenbelt)
Timothy Maloney – General Litigation (Greenbelt)
Valerie Grove – Personal Injury Medical Malpractice: Plaintiff (Greenbelt)
Steven Pavsner – Personal Injury Medical Malpractice: Plaintiff (Greenbelt)
William J. Inman – Workers Comp (Rockville) 

And JGL Rising Stars include:

Christopher Castellano – Rising Star -Family Law (Rockville)
Drew LaFramboise – Rising Star – Personal Injury Products: Plaintiff (Greenbelt)

An Anne Arundel jury awarded $8.5 million in damages to a Maryland woman who sued her former boyfriend for infecting her with genital herpes.

Read more here.

Brown who takes office in January of 2023 recently named leaders of his transition teams focused on civil rights, consumer protection, the environment, equity and ethics, labor, procurement and public safety.

Brown also named Timothy Maloney, of Joseph, Greenwald & Laake PA’s Greenbelt office as a senior transition adviser, joining former Chief Deputy DC Attorney General Jason Downs; University of Maryland law professor Larry S. Gibson; and National Capital Planning Commission Commissioner Elizabeth M. “Betty” Hewlett

If you are currently embroiled in a custody dispute or have a family member, co-worker or colleague going through a custody dispute, you may have wondered does the Court consider the child’s input or desires. We’ll examine that and additional factors in child custody decisions.

Does My Child’s Preference Really Matter?

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals stated that “the children have a substantial interest in the outcome of their parents’ custody dispute and are individuals with rights recognized by the courts, even though they are not formally recognized parties to the lawsuit.” Auclair v. Auclair, 127 Md. App. 1, 12-13 (1999)

The Court’s Role

In Maryland in order to determine custody, the trial court is required to determine the best interests of the minor child. “In Montgomery County v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 420 (1977).  In Leary v. Leary, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals stated “[t]he bottom line in any custody dispute is: what is in the ‘best interests’ of the children? citing Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172 (1977) and a judge agonizes more about reaching the right result in a contested custody issue than about any other type of decision he renders.” Leary v. Leary, 97 Md. App. 26, 37 (1993).

Most Important Factors in Child Custody

To assist trial courts, the Court of Special Appeals set forth a list of factors that a trial court should consider to determine the children’s best interests. “The criteria for judicial determination [of child custody] includes, but is not limited to the 1) fitness of the parents;  2) character and reputation of the parties;  3) desire of the natural parents and agreements between the parties; 4) potentiality of maintaining natural family relations; 5) preference of the child; 6) material opportunities affecting the future life of the child; 7) age, health and sex of the child; 8) residences of parents and opportunity for visitation; 9) length of separation from the natural parents;  and 10) prior voluntary abandonment or surrender.” Montgomery County v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 420, 381 A.2d 1154 (1977), see also, Md. Ann Code, Family Law Art. § 9-104, Taylor v. Taylor, 60 Md. App. 268 (1984), judgment vacated, 306 Md. 290 (1986), and Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172 (1977).

The children’s preference is “clearly reflected in the best interest of the child standard that is used to resolve custody determinations.”  In Leary v. Leary, 97 Md. App. 26, 48 (1993). The Court of Appeals explained:

The desires of the child are consulted, not because of any legal right to decide the question of custody, but because the court should know them in order to be better able to exercise its discretion wisely. It is not the whim of the child that the court respects, but [the child’s] feelings, attachments, reasonable preference and probable contentment. (cited in Auclair v. Auclair, 127 Md. App. 1, 12-13 (1999))

The Court May Interview the Minor Child

Maryland case law and statutes are clear that the court may consider the child’s preference. “The trial court has the discretion to interview a child.” Marshall v. Stefanides, 17 Md. App. 364 (1973). In Karanikas v. Cartwright, 209 Md. App. 571 (2013) the Court of Special Appeals, “[t]he trial judge exercised this discretion by electing to hear other testimony first in order to determine whether the child’s testimony would be useful. The trial judge later … decided to interview the child in chambers.” Id. at 595.  The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court did not err in handling the issue of interviewing the child in this manner.

At What Age Can a Child Make Custody Decisions?

If the court does interview a child(ren), the court can then determine weight to give the child’s preference:

“[I]n determining in a contest for custody what will promote the best interests of the child, the child’s own wishes may be consulted and given weight if he is of sufficient age and capacity to form a rational judgment. … But we adopt the rule that there is no specific age of a child at which his wishes should be consulted and given weight by the court. The matter depends upon the extent of the child’s mental development.”  Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 353 (1952) [Emphasis added], see also, Leary v. Leary, 97 Md. App. 26, 36 (1993) (citing Casey v. Casey, 210 Md. 464, 474 (1956)). [Emphasis added]

Competency of a Child as a Witness

In Krebs v. Krebs, the Court of Appeals reviewed the “the propriety of an order passed granting custody to the mother of a girl [  ] 12 years of age and of a boy [   ] 9 years of age. Krebs v. Krebs, 255 Md. 264, 264 (1969) Ultimately, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court without affirming or reversing the trial court.

The Court explained the significance of examining all factors in a custody determination. “We are not here dealing with chattels. We are dealing with two growing children who, undoubtedly, love both of their parents, and who are loved by both of their parents, children who have suffered tremendously from the trauma of their parents’ separation and the warfare between the parents.”  Krebs v. Krebs, 255 Md. 264, 266 (1969) “The absolute obligation on the trial judge to undertake a thorough examination of all possible factors before determining child custody was forcefully set out by Judge McAuliffe in Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 303 (1986):

Formula or computer solutions in child custody matters are impossible because of the unique character of each case, and the subjective nature of the evaluations and decisions that must be made. … no single list of criteria will satisfy the demands of every case.

We emphasize that in any child custody case, the paramount concern is the best interest of the child.The best interest of the child is therefore not considered as one of many factors, but as the objective to which virtually all other factors speak.  [Emphasis supplied in original).

While the Maryland appellate courts have not determined a precise age for the trial courts to consider, in Brandau v. Webster, 39 Md. App. 99 (1978), the trial court refused to hear testimony from the 6 year old child, Erika, of the parties in determining the custody of the two oldest children (the court did hear, and weigh heavily, the testimony of the two older children who were 16 and 15.5 at the time).  On appeal, the Court stated that “[t]he sole question to be decided by us is whether the Chancellor erred in refusing to conduct or to allow a voir dire examination of Erika in order to determine her competency to testify as a witness in this case.” Id. at 103.

The Court of Special Appeals found that “it was error for the Chancellor to refuse to conduct the examination of the proposed witness … either in court or in chambers in order to determine whether she was, in fact, a competent witness. It is true that the decision us to the competency of a witness is within the sound discretion of the trial court but the court must at least conduct such an examination as will disclose the factual basis on which his conclusion as to competency rests.”  Id. at 105-106. [Emphasis added]

In support of that conclusion the Court stated:

“As there is no precise age which determines the question of competency, the court must resort to a determination of the capacity and intelligence of the child and its appreciation of the difference between truth and falsehood.”

Thus, a trial court is required to make judicial inquiry in determining the competency of a child.

The Court’s Method of Interviewing a Child

A child would likely feel uncomfortable testifying in front of his parents, so judges typically interview children in their chambers.  Many times, judges will remove their official robe to help a child feel more at ease. (One judge has a ping pong table in his chambers to help children feel more comfortable.)

“In a custody case, it is proper for the chancellor, in his discretion, to interview the child out of the presence of the parties, with or without the consent of the parties and with or without the presence of counsel. In all cases, unless waived by the parties, the interview must be recorded by a court reporter and immediately following the interview its content shall be made known to counsel and the parties by means of the court reporter’s reading of the record to them.” Shapiro v. Shapiro, 54 Md. App. 477, 480 (1983).

“It has been held that it is the duty of the Court to conduct the child’s examination; that the child’s appearance, fear or composure, general demeanor and manner of answering and any indication of coaching or instruction as to answers to be given are as significant as the words used in answering during the examination, to determine competency, and it is impossible to make such important and necessary observations unless the child appears personally before the court.’ ‘It is error to arbitrarily exclude the child as a witness without such examination.’” Volume 81, American Jurisprudence 2d, Witnesses, Section 92.

Child Custody Lawyers

Obviously, in determining whether a child should testify, a party and his or her legal counsel should give consideration to the child’s own feelings, the impact the child’s testimony may have on the child and his or her relationship with each of the parents, and the psychological impact it may have on the child.  While it is sometimes not ideal to have children testify, the trial court can also appoint a Best Interest Attorney to meet the objective of considering the child’s preferences without subjecting the child(ren) the scrutiny of being in Court or the later ramifications of believing they may have played a party in the dissolution of their family (discussed more in depth here).

Experts in Maryland Child Custody Laws

If you are considering a divorce and have children, one of the best things you can do is to retain a child custody lawyer. A Maryland child custody lawyer will be experienced in negotiations and creating agreeable parenting arrangements. Serving the areas of Maryland, the District of Columbia, and Virginia, JGL child custody and divorce attorneys are here to serve you. Contact us today to set up a free appointment.

Darin L. Rumer is a partner in Joseph, Greenwald & Laake’s Family Law practice group.  Mr. Rumer has successfully tried multiple divorce, custody and child support cases throughout the state of Maryland for over 20 years and routinely provides counsel to clients as they navigate a difficult and stressful time in their lives. Mr. Rumer routinely advises and represents clients in family law matters including child custody and divorce litigation, separation agreements, child support and alimony issues, property distribution issues, domestic violence, and all other areas of family law.

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As the name would imply, a prenuptial agreement is an agreement determining how to divide your assets in the event of a divorce or dissolution of the marriage.  So, you can’t enter into a prenuptial agreement after marriage, but that does not prevent you from reach an agreement on how to treat assets in the event of a divorce.  While it is not discussed as frequently as prenuptial agreements, you can sign a post-nuptial agreement.

Just like prenups, postnuptial agreements are very common. They’re designed to determine who owns what in the event of a divorce, but they are also valuable documents for happily married couples. Financial issues are cited as some of the key causes of marital disharmony, and drafting a postnuptial agreement can help you communicate better about finances, supporting a healthy marriage.

So, how does a postnupt work?  Here, we explore what a postnuptial agreement is, how to get one, and whether a postnup or prenup is right for you and your partner.

What is a Postnuptial Agreement? 

There are three types of property, premarital, marital and non-marital.  A postnuptial agreement outlines which assets will remain yours, which belong to your spouse, and which assets should be divided between you, should you choose to divorce.

If either you or your partner is a business owner, has a higher net worth, debt, or has to give up work to take care of children, a prenup or postnup can be highly beneficial for both of you. You can learn more by reading our blog post or listening to our podcast on “What is a Prenup and Who Needs One?”

Are Postnuptial Agreements Enforceable?

Yes – postnuptial agreements are enforceable, although a divorce court may not always agree with the document entirely.

As long as standard contractual rules are followed and the agreement doesn’t contradict with state laws (for example around financial support for children in the event of divorce) postnups and prenups are considered legally enforceable documents.

How to Get a Postnuptial Agreement

Whether you live in Maryland, the District of Columbia, or Virginia, it’s important that you work with an experienced legal team that is local to you, to ensure your postnuptial agreement is as valid as possible.

Request a consultation with a prenup and postnup attorney to get started.

Prenup vs. Postnup: Which is Right for Me?

So, what is the difference between a prenup and postnup? A postnuptial agreement gives you all the benefits of a prenup; other than the fact you’re already married at the time of signing, it’s essentially the same thing.

Perhaps your financial circumstances have changed since you got married – maybe you’ve received some inheritance or one of you has taken out a loan. These are great reasons to get a postnup.

If you’d like to set stronger financial boundaries to support your marriage, or have assets you’d prefer to keep should you separate, either a prenup or a postnuptial agreement can help.  Providing a potential spouse limited time to review a prenuptial agreement and/or not having sufficient time to seek legal counsel to consult with for a prenuptial agreement may be a basis for a Court to set aside a prenuptial agreement later on.   So, if you’re engaged and have sufficient time to draft and review a prenuptial agreement with an attorney prior to the wedding day, choose a prenuptial agreement, but if there is limited time to review a prenuptial agreement or you’re already married, a postnuptial agreement is right for you.

Get a Postnuptial Agreement in Maryland

The skilled attorneys at JGL Law can help you draft a postnuptial agreement with as much integrity and legal weight as possible. Contact our legal team today to schedule a consultation, for a happier marriage now, and a secure future.

in memory of our beloved partner and friend BURT M. KAHN, ESQ.

Congratulations to all fourteen of JGL’s Best Lawyers® and Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch™ in America – chosen by a time-honored peer-review process.

Click to view the recipients (PDF)

Joseph, Greenwald and Laake has been representing clients in suburban Maryland and the District of Columbia for almost 50 years. With offices in Greenbelt and Rockville, Maryland, we have lawyers who focus their practices in diverse areas of the law, including employment and whistleblower actions, family law, estates and trusts, civil rights, business planning and commercial litigation, personal injury, medical and professional negligence.

In this episode, Debora Fajer-Smith and David Bulitt discuss the following issues and more:

  1. Hollywood and Workers Compensation – Assault vs. Negligence
  2. Protecting Teachers in Schools – Assault at random or Assault incidentally
  3. Gig Economy (Uber, Lyft, Handymen, etc.) Employee vs. Independent contractors  

JGL LAW FOR YOU brings you up close and personal with our lawyers who will be discussing how to navigate the many legal processes,  developments in the law, other current events and how they may affect you.

Three officers with the Maryland State Police have filed a proposed class-action lawsuit over what they describe as widespread racial discrimination within the department.

The complaint alleges MSP routinely disciplines officers of color more harshly than white officers, denies promotions to officers of color and retaliates against those who speak up about their treatment.

MSP is already under investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice, which is probing whether the department’s hiring and promotion practices are racially discriminatory.

The new federal lawsuit proposes a class made up of officers of color who were disciplined, denied promotions or otherwise faced discrimination from October 2019 to the present day. A judge would have to approve the group before the lawsuit could move forward as a class action.

The 36-page complaint was filed Monday in U.S. District Court in Greenbelt. It claims that MSP maintains “centralized disciplinary policies and procedures that disparately treat officers of color” compared to their white colleagues on the force.

The plaintiffs are Byron Tribue and Matin Dunlap, Black men who are currently officers with MSP, and Analisse Diaz, a Black Puerto Rican woman who was terminated from MSP in 2019.

In a statement, MSP said the complaint is currently under legal review and the department cannot share information about the allegations in the lawsuit.

“The Maryland Department of State Police remains committed to providing the highest quality of law enforcement services to the people of Maryland, while ensuring the fair and equitable treatment of all employees,” the department said in the statement. “Significant actions have been taken and are continuing to address even the perception of racism or unfair treatment of any kind.”

The complaint alleges that Tribue was suspended for 301 days while he was investigated for leaving work one hour early to make up for attending a meeting on one of his days off. This was a common practice at MSP, according to the complaint, but Tribue, who was known for raising concerns about racial discrimination, was treated harshly over the timecard issue.

The drawn-out investigation and discipline process meant Tribue was ineligible for a promotion that year despite ranking well on the sergeant promotion list. A trial board ultimately issued a 10-day suspension for the infraction, according to the complaint.

When Tribue eventually received the sergeant promotion, he was assigned to the Rockville Barrack, which was a significant commute from his home, instead of the Forestville Barrack, where he was stationed.

The complaint also claims that MSP officials retaliated against Dunlap after he complained that a white corporal placed a banana on Dunlap’s work vehicle. The corporal was not disciplined and has been repeatedly promoted, according to the complaint.

After Dunlap complained, MSP reopened an investigation into a complaint stemming from a traffic stop, suspended him for three years and charged him criminally in the incident. The Baltimore Sun reported in 2019 that prosecutors dropped assault charges against Dunlap, who had been accused of striking a man with a baton during the stop.

Dunlap remains an officer with MSP but has been denied opportunities to work in specialized units, which benefit officers seeking promotions, the suit contends.
Diaz alleges other racist incidents in the complaint, including being told by a sergeant that he did not think it was a “big deal” to say the “n-word.” On another occasion, Diaz claims, she was told MSP should hire her as cleaning staff, in an apparent reference to her being Hispanic.

Diaz performed well as an officer, and her fluency in Spanish and other skills were useful to MSP’s Drug Enforcement Unit, according to the complaint, but she was passed over when she applied to join the specialized unit. A supervisor began retaliating against Diaz when she was chosen for a prestigious training program, the complaint claims, and wrote her a poor performance review.

MSP’s Internal Affairs office investigated Diaz for nearly 18 months and ultimately proposed terminating her over what the complaint describes as “low level mistakes.” The complaint does not detail what accusations led to Diaz’s termination.

Caucasian officers have not been similarly disciplined for more serious infractions, the complaint claims. Some white officers have failed to report for duty because they were under the influence of alcohol or got into vehicle crashes outside their assigned work areas while on duty, but were not charged with offenses, according to the complaint.

Other white officers engaged in excessive force or, in one case, left a gun in a convenience store, and were not terminated, the complaint claims.

The complaint also references previously reported incidents, including the use of a paper shooting target that depicts a cartoonish person of color at a gun range in Western Maryland and a commemorative coin that used the phrase “Make Waldorf Great Again” in reference to an anti-crime initiative.

According to the complaint, some other MSP employees have filed discrimination charges with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and will be added to the lawsuit after they receive notice of the right to sue from the agency.

The lawyer for the plaintiffs, Michal Shinnar, of Joseph, Greenwald & Laake, P.A., did not immediately return a phone call seeking comment Tuesday.

In a statement, MSP said the complaint is currently under legal review and the department cannot share information about the allegations in the lawsuit.

“The Maryland Department of State Police remains committed to providing the highest quality of law enforcement services to the people of Maryland, while ensuring the fair and equitable treatment of all employees,” the department said in the statement. “Significant actions have been taken and are continuing to address even the perception of racism or unfair treatment of any kind.”

Title IX is a civil rights law focused on preventing educational discrimination, harassment, and retaliation based on sex. Learn more.

Title IX states that:

No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.

This statute was part of the 1972 Education Amendments; it has now been just over 50 years since it was passed. However, many people are unaware of this key piece of federal law that still protects us today.

Getting to know Title IX (and your rights in general) can help you advocate for yourself when necessary. Read on to learn more about Title IX here and better understand the scenarios in which it takes effect.

If you’ve experienced sex-based discrimination, harassment, or retaliation in an educational setting, request a consultation with our Title IX abuse and discrimination team today.

What is the Purpose of Title IX?

Title IX has helped level the playing field in the educational world. A vast number of schools, colleges, and educational programs receive federal funding, and as such, are not permitted to discriminate in terms of admissions, scholarships, equipment provisions, and more.

Title IX also protects students against sexual harassment and assault. Everything from assault, to unwanted touching, to verbal harassment can impede students’ access to education and cause sex-based discrimination.

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services clarifies that the “sex discrimination” Title IX protects against also includes pregnancy discrimination, sexual orientation discrimination, and gender identity discrimination.

If your experience took place outside of an educational establishment, we can still help. Turn to our sexual assault and abuse litigation team, which supports survivors of rape, unwanted touching, childhood abuse, incest, and other unwanted sexual activity.

Our Title IX Team

Our Title IX team is here to help you seek justice if you have faced sex-based discrimination or harassment in an educational setting.

Our team has deep experience handling Title IX cases against federally-funded institutions, such as the Liberty University Sexual Assault Lawsuit, in which we represent “Jane Doe” in her suit against Liberty University. On April 27, 2021, the plaintiff was raped by another Liberty student, in an off-campus student housing complex. In April 2022, our team filed a Complaint to hold Liberty University accountable for failing to investigate the reported incident or take protective measures.

Learn more about this case and read news stories on the topic to stay informed.

You’re Protected by Title IX and Our Team

Our team is here to help people of all ages, sexes, and genders enforce their rights under Title IX.  If you or a loved one have suffered harassment and discrimination in an educational setting or by a federally-funded institution, please contact Greenwald and Laake, P.A. to schedule a free consultation, and see how we can help you find justice.

This is the second installment in a recap series that aims to summarize the reported cases coming out of the Maryland appellate courts: the Maryland Court of Appeals, and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. Detailed by Joseph, Greenwald & Laake associate, this document provides a synopsis of the Courts’ opinions.

In our first installment, we covered cases decided by the courts since January 2022. Read on as we progress through more recent cases tackled in Maryland.

(Note: The Maryland Court of Appeals’ attorney grievance and bar matters will not be covered.)

Paula v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore

This case involves two Plaintiffs, both Baltimore City residents, who filed suit against the City of Baltimore over its alleged mismanagement of the Civilian Review Board (CRB). The CRB is a statutory agency that processes and investigates complaints about law enforcement officers from the public. The City filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that the Plaintiffs did not have the standing to bring the suit. The Circuit Court agreed and dismissed the suit. This case, in essence, is about standing, the doctrine that ensures that a party filing a lawsuit has a real interest in the outcome and that an actual controversy or dispute has occurred that the court can resolve. By reviewing this case, we can see how standing operates in the legal system.

On appeal, the Plaintiffs argued that the dismissal of their suit was erroneous as they had standing to sue the City. First, they claimed that the alleged mismanagement of the CRB uniquely aggrieved them in comparison with other Baltimore City residents. Additionally, they argued that they had a right to a properly functioning CRB as stated by its establishing statute. This issue, they claim, could be vindicated through legal action. This is called normal standing. Second, they argued that they had taxpayer standing. This version of standing allows a taxpayer to sue the City if an illegal or unauthorized action by the City causes the taxpayer unique monetary loss or an increase in the taxes they owe. Lastly, they argued that Articles 9, 19, and/or 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights gave them standing to sue the City.

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals rejected each of these arguments. First, the Court found that the Plaintiff’s interest was not personal. It was noted that the CRB exists not to redress specific instances of misconduct to the complainant but to maintain the integrity of the Baltimore City Police Department as a whole. Critically, the Court held that the Plaintiffs were never denied the right to file a complaint. Instead, the complaint was contested only after it was filed. Second, the Court held that the Plaintiff’s status as Baltimore City taxpayers did not give them standing because the alleged mismanagement of the CRB did not cause them specific monetary harm. Significantly, the Plaintiffs failed to connect the CRB’s alleged mismanagement to expenditures or inefficiencies that would have been avoided if the CRB was properly managed and sufficiently independent from the City’s control. Lastly, the Court held that the Plaintiffs did not have standing under Articles 9, 19, or 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

  • Article 9 provides that only the General Assembly can “suspend Laws, or the execution of Laws.” The Plaintiffs never argued that the law establishing the CRB had been effectively suspended by the City. Instead, they only claimed that the City was violating the CRB statute. The violation of a law is not the same as its suspension.
  • Article 19 provides access to the Courts. The Court held that the Plaintiffs were not denied access to the court system. The trial court held, and the Court of Special Appeals agreed, that there was simply no injury to the Plaintiffs specifically that the courts could redress.
  • Articles 24 provides a right to due process of law. The Court found that the Plaintiffs were not deprived of any right without process. Only law enforcement officers who are subject to possible discipline from the CRB are entitled to due process protections under Article 24. This does not include those who file complaints with the CRB.

This case is best understood as an application of the principle that there is no right that can be vindicated in the judicial system which entitles a citizen to “good” governance unless the alleged “bad” governance affects them differently than it affects the rest of the public.

Playmark Inc. et al. v. Perret

This case involves James Perret, the Plaintiff, who was employed by AAA, Inc. In 2000, AAA agreed that if Perret continued to work for AAA in a managerial capacity from 2000 until 2015, AAA would pay Perrett $25,000 per year until 2025. By reviewing this case, the obligations of corporate successors will be illuminated.

In 2005, AAA was split up into two separate entities that continued to provide the same services. After this company shift, Perrett was still employed in a managerial capacity. In 2015, Perret started to receive the $25,000 payments. The payments ceased, however, when the owners of the AAA successor entities, who were previously married, got a divorce. This effectively split the two successor entities again—into Playmark and Pro Rec—so they could each maintain half of what they previously owned prior to the divorce. They, then, parted ways.

James Perrett filed suit against Playmark and Pro Rec, alleging that by failing to make the $25,000 annual payments, they had breached the contract agreed upon in 2000. He also alleged, both additionally and in the alternative, that the failure to make the annual payments violated the Maryland Wage Act, which prohibits the wrongful withholding of wages by employers upon termination. The trial court agreed with Perret by finding that Playmark and Pro Rec did breach the 2000 agreement. It was found that the two companies were liable for the annual payments due to Perret. The trial court, however, rejected Perret’s arguments under the Maryland Wage Act. Playmark and Pro Rec appealed the ruling on the breach of contract claim, and Perret cross-appealed the ruling on the dismissal of his Wage Act claim.

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the breach of contract claim and held that Playmark and Pro-Rec were obligated to make the annual payments to Perret. This is because, ultimately, they were the successors of the initial corporation, AAA. Meaning, that they had explicitly agreed to assume the obligation to pay Perret. The Court included an illustration in its opinion that shows how AAA became two separate entities, which were then divided again into two more entities.

The Court of Special Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Perret’s Maryland Wage Act Claim. The effect of this, though the Court noted, is likely negligible as the damages under the contract action and the Maryland Wage Act are the same. The only difference is that, under the Maryland Wage Act, a plaintiff is entitled to three times the damages sought, attorney’s fees, and costs if they can demonstrate that the employer’s failure to pay the money owed was “not as a result of a bona fide dispute.” The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on Perret’s Maryland Wage Act claim.

This decision should stand as a reminder to businesses that unwanted corporate obligations do not disappear. Even a clever corporate restructuring designed to avoid successor liability by dividing assets in such a way that no successor acquires “substantially all” the assets of the former corporation, as was done here, will not avoid successor liability. Instead, if half of the assets of a company are transferred to two successor entities (or a third to three, or a fourth to four, etc.) each of the entities that together acquired the assets will be held liable for the obligations in proportion to the assets they acquired.

Beckwitt v. Maryland

This peculiar and tragic case involves Beckwitt, a paranoid millionaire fearing nuclear war. Beckwitt hired Askia Khafra, a young man whose company Beckwitt had invested in, to dig tunnels beneath his home in Montgomery County. The tunnels would become littered with trash and debris. Beckwitt provided power to the tunnels via a series of extension cords and power strips. Hours before a fire broke out in the tunnels, Khafra informed Beckwitt of a power failure. Khafra was killed in the fire.

A jury in Montgomery County convicted Beckwitt of involuntary manslaughter and depraved-heart murder. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the involuntary manslaughter conviction and reversed the conviction for depraved-heart murder. While Beckwitt demonstrated a “wanton and reckless” disregard for Khafra’s life, his conduct did not rise to the level of “extreme disregard for human life reasonably likely to cause death” that was needed to sustain the depraved-heart murder conviction. The Court of Special Appeals explained that hiring someone to dig tunnels underneath their home does not rise to the level of opprobrious conduct that a conviction for depraved-heart murder requires.

Beckwitt appealed the Court of Special Appeals’ affirmation of his manslaughter conviction and raised several arguments, some of which are not addressed here because they were not essential to the result of the case on appeal. The State appealed the reversal of the depraved-heart murder conviction.

First, he argued that under pre-1776 English statutes, which prohibited prosecution against someone in whose home an accidental fire started, the state could not hold him criminally responsible for the fire. Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction over the criminal prosecution. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that Beckwitt’s argument did not implicate the trial court’s jurisdiction, and therefore could not be raised on appeal. After a well-researched and informative explanation of why the pre-1776 statutes were inapplicable, the Court wrote that even if the old English statutes were applicable in Maryland, the fire that killed Khafra was not accidental. Instead, Beckwitt was convicted because the conditions he created in his basement and the tunnels made it so that Khafra could not report and escape from a potentially life-threatening situation.

Beckwitt also argued that he could not be convicted for involuntary manslaughter based on gross negligence. Hiring Khafra to work in his home with hoarding conditions and power outages was not likely to cause harm to the person. Hoarding, he argues, is not inherently dangerous conduct. His conduct, therefore, was not a “wanton and reckless disregard for human life” necessary to support the conviction for involuntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Beckwitt’s gross negligence caused Khafra’s death. The Court of Appeals held that “on multiple levels, Beckwitt’s conduct constituted a departure from the conduct that a reasonable person would have engaged in under similar circumstances. No reasonable person would have required Khafra to live and work in a basement with a faulty supply of electricity for light and airflow and without a reliable way for Khafra to contact him.  No reasonable person would have maintained the abhorrent conditions that existed in the basement with debris and trash blocking Khafra’s route out in the event of an emergency.  And no reasonable person would have reacted as casually as Beckwitt did on the day of the fire upon learning of the two power outages in the basement.” The Court also wrote that Beckwitt, as Khafra’s employer under Maryland law, had a legal duty to provide safe working conditions and a jury could have potentially convicted him of involuntary manslaughter on that basis also.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of Special Appeals’ reversal of the depraved-heart murder conviction. While Beckwitt acted strangely, negligently, and recklessly, he did not act with the “extreme indifference” necessary for depraved-heart murder.

After the Court’s ruling was issued in January, Beckwitt was resentenced to five years in prison, much of which he has already served.

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